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Abstract: In 483/2 BC the ancient Athenians voted to spend the revenue from 
recently discovered silver deposits to build a navy instead of distributing it as cash 
transfers to all citizens. The navy was pivotal for victory against the invading 
Persians and secured the power and wealth of classical Athens. The paper 
discusses three interrelated issues. (1) The use of the voting mechanism to decide 
the disposal of the revenue from natural resources. (2) The binary nature of the 
choice, either transfers or defence but not a combination of the two. (3) An 
explanation of the vote based on the increase in probability of military victory 
following an increase in defence spending. 
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1. Introduction 
  
In 483/2 BC, the ancient Athenians struck an unusually rich silver vein in 
Southern Attica. One proposal for the disposal of the revenue from the 
windfall was to distribute it equally among the thirty thousand citizens, 
thought to be a common practice at the time,
1
 and pay each recipient ten 
                   
1 Gabrielsen, 1994: 235, n.27 
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drachmas when a labourer’s wage was one drachma a day.2 However, a 
second proposal, made by Themistocles, one of the leading statesmen of 
the time, was to spend the money on the construction of a large navy. One 
hundred triremes were to be built for use against the island of Aegina 
competing against Athens for supremacy in the Aegean Sea and an 
additional one hundred talents were to be deposited with the hundred 
richest Athenian citizens, each one receiving one talent, for future related 
use.  
The assembly voted in favour of the Themistocles proposal that became 
known as the “Naval Bill”. Following additional shipbuilding, the number 
of Athenian ships increased to two hundreds, counting for two thirds of the 
total Greek fleet that in 480 vanquished the Persians in the sea battle of 
Salamis, and again in Mycale in 479. The 482 vote was pivotal for Athens 
and even for the modern Western democracies the intellectual heirs of 
ancient Greece. Not only guaranteed her survival as an independent 
political entity, but also established Athens as a leading power, 
precipitating further democratic reforms, economic prosperity and 
unprecedented artistic achievements.
3
 Using the insights of modern 
political economy, the present paper inquires three aspects of the crucial 
vote of 482, namely, the use of the voting mechanism to decide the 
disposal of the revenue from natural resources, the binary nature of the 
choice to pay a transfer or build ships but not a combination of the two, 
and the outcome of the vote in favour of defence rather than a cash 
transfer.   
In the first instance, it bears noting that it was the Athenian assembly of 
citizens which decided directly on the use of public revenue, rather than 
the political elite or the representatives of the voters, a procedure that had 
no equal in ancient or modern polities (at least at the national scale). More 
significantly, the majority voted for spending the extra revenue on defence 
rather than a cash transfer. Standard economic theory predicts that in 
general individuals motivated by self–interest are better off with a cash–
benefit rather than a benefit–in–kind of an equal value, because they are 
free to spend the extra resources as they wish, and they would rather 
divide a given budget between a public good and a transfer than spend the 
entire revenue on either of the two only. Were the Athenians or at least the 
majority of the citizens overwhelmed by notions of patriotic duty that 
                   
2
 With a number of citizens estimated at 30,000 this implies that the total revenue 
was 50 talents, where 1 talent = 6,000 drachmas. Finer (1999) reports that a family 
of four could live off 280 drachmae a year.  
3
 See Morris (2008, 2010). 
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made them oblivious to their financial self–interests, or were their interests 
better served by strengthening the defence of the polis? 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the shipbuilding 
programme. Section 3 surveys issues regarding the use of democratic 
procedures to decide public spending programmes and the natural resource 
curse where economies rich in resources perform poorly. Section 4 
examines the binary nature of the Athenian choice, transfer or defence 
only, and offers an account of instrumental versus expressive voting. 
Section 5 searches for an explanation of the vote in favour of defence 
using the insights of the economic theory of conflict. Confronted with the 
uncertain outcome of conflict, it was rational for the Athenians to boost 
their military capabilities in order to increase the probability of victory 
against their adversaries. Employing a formal model of expected utility 
maximization and game interactions it is found that investing the silver 
windfall in defence yielded a higher expected payoff than a transfer. Thus, 
in an ex ante sense, the Athenians were better off increasing defence 
spending. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The shipbuilding programme  
 
By the time of the discovery of the silver deposits, 483/2, Athens was 
already operating direct democracy after the Cleisthenes reforms of 508 
BC that laid down rules for citizenship and participatory governance.
4
 
Decisions on domestic and foreign policy issues were made by the 
Assembly of all Athenian male citizens by majority voting. Assembly 
businesses were coordinated by the Council of Five Hundred, a body of 
citizens selected by lot for an annual term of service. Public officials, like 
the elected Ten Generals responsible for foreign policy and commanding 
the army, as well as any citizen could initiate legislation by bringing an 
issue to the attention of the Council which after deliberation would 
introduce the issue to the Assembly, either for ratification of specific 
decree already passed by the Council, or as an open issue to be discussed 
and voted by the Assembly. It was a standard practice for an individual 
citizen who so chose to speak during the Assembly. The Cleisthenes 
reforms had also established a national army of heavy infantry (hoplites) 
whose ranks were filled by the propertied classes that paid for and owned 
                   
4 The original record is found in the Athenian Constitution of Aristotle. Ober 
(1996) Ch. 4 offers a reconstruction and an interpretation of the events leading up 
to the Cleisthenes reforms, while Hansen (1999) amongst others presents a detailed 
analysis of the nature of the Athenian democracy, 508 – 322. See also Tridimas 
(2011a) for a political economy account of her governance institutions. 
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their armoury, but excluded the poor class of thetes, who did not afford the 
expense and served only as light–armed troops. The hoplites army showed 
its worth first in defending Athens against other Greek city–states and, 
more importantly in defeating the invading Persians in the 490 battle of 
Marathon.  
In the 480s Athenian politics were dominated by the rivalry between 
Themistocles who advocated the policy of turning Athens into a sea 
power, and Aristides, who seemingly opposed it. It is a matter of great 
regret that the original ancient authors, Herodotus in his Histories of the 
Persian wars, Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War, 
Aristotle in the Athenian Constitution and Plutarch in his life of 
Themistocles give only terse and somehow contradictory accounts of the 
events surrounding the discovery of the silver veins and the use of the 
expected revenue.
5
 We may surmise that following the practice of the time 
the Assembly was asked to approve the distribution of the bonanza to the 
citizens but Themistocles counter–proposed to use the money to build 
ships. The details of the debate are not known. What is known is that in 
Assembly debates, after listening to the speakers, the Athenians voted by 
show of hands and decisions were taken by simple majority. Hansen 
(1999: 147) describes the voting process as one where “the voting was 
administered by nine “chairmen.” They first called for the “ayes” to raise 
their hands and then the “noes.” We have very little evidence how the 
estimation was carried out… Aristotle’s Athenian Constitution implies 
that the chairmen assessed rather than counted the majority of votes and 
the same is also implied by Aristophanes. In case of doubt the show of 
hands was repeated.”6  
Themistocles won the argument having Aristides ostracised, but we 
know nothing of the speeches made in the Assembly, the size of the 
majority for the shipbuilding programme, how it related to Aristides’ 
ostracism and the exact date of the latter. Ostracism, introduced by 
Cleisthenes, was a mechanism by which the demos decided whether or not 
to banish a leading individual, allegedly as a defense of the demos against 
potential tyrants.
7
 However, Cartledge (2006) argues that Aristides was 
                   
5 The English translations of the original passages are reproduced in the Appendix. 
Wallinga (1993, chapter 6) offers a critical survey of the sources and of the views 
expressed by modern historians.  
6 Two important exceptions to voting by hand were decisions on ostracism and 
grants of citizenship which were conducted by actual ballot voting. 
7 The person ostracized had to leave Athens in ten days after the vote and reside 
away from the city, but suffered no financial or any other punishment. For a 
thorough analysis see Forsdyke (2000). It is worth noting that, in the interest of 
unity against Persia and with the consent of Themistocles, Aristides returned 
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ostracized not because he was a threat to democracy, but to circumvent 
impasses about highly divisive issues of policy and leadership. That is, 
from the viewpoint of modern collective choice theory, ostracism 
generated a “structure induced equilibrium.”8 
Focusing on the discovery of the silver deposits and the shipbuilding 
programme, modern historians have inquired whether the windfall 
financed the construction of one hundred ships (Aristotle and Plutarch) or 
two hundred ships (Herodotus), the cost of construction per ship and the 
annual crew cost, how many of those ships were built in Athens and how 
many were bought from other city–states; the finance of the running costs 
of the fleet and especially whether it started a liturgy
9
 known as trierarchy 
(trireme–leadership), according to which the wealthiest Athenians were 
responsible to pay for the command, outfitting and maintenance of a 
trireme for one year; and whether the silver vein was struck in Laurium or 
Maroneia (both located in Southern Attica). For a review and re–
examination of the evidence see Gabrielsen (1994). The trireme, a vessel 
of three rows of oarsmen on each side with a total of two hundred rowers 
supplemented with two sails was an offensive naval weapon able to attain 
high speeds under oars; its radius was however restricted by carrying 
limited food and water supplies, which made its use dependent on a 
network of coastal bases. It was very expensive to build, and even more so 
to maintain and pay for crew. Gabrielsen (1994) estimates that the average 
cost for feeding the crew for a month was half a talent (p.122), and crew 
pay was another talent for a month (p.124). Wallinga (1993) establishes 
that Themistocles’ law called for 100 ships to be built (a number matching 
the strength of Athens’ Greek adversaries). He then argues that 
Themistocles proposed to entrust the money to private citizens rather than 
state officials in order to avoid the temptation that politicians would use it 
for other purposes. In modern parlance, the latter arrangement aimed to 
enhance the credibility of the warships programme. Further, Wallinga 
                                                                                                                                                    
before the end of the 10 year period shortly before the Battle of Salamis. 
8 See Shepsle and Weingast (2012) for a recent review of voting cycles and their 
elimination under different institutional settings. 
9 Liturgies were compulsory private payments by the richest Athenians for public 
services. They were a mechanism for public provision circumventing both taxation 
and public procurement. They probably started with the Cleisthenes reforms. 
Liturgies before Themistocles’ naval law included the finance of theatrical 
productions, athletic training and the organization of public religious feasts. See 
Davies (1967) for a description of liturgies and Lyttkens (1997) for an examination 
of the liturgies in the light of the rational actor model. For an economic analysis of 
the trierarchy using the insights of mechanism design theory for the provision of 
public goods see Carmichael (1997) and Kaiser (2007).  
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argues that in assessing the desired strength of the new fleet Themistocles 
must have taken account not only of the strength of Aegina but of her 
potential Greek allies too, calculated at 99 ships (Wallinga, 1993:155), 
while the Persians were not thought as an immediate threat. When the 
Athenians found out that the Persians were amassing a fleet of some 1,200 
triremes (Wallinga, 1993: p.161) for another invasion to Greece, they must 
have used (part of) the reserve of 100 talents deposited with the richest 
Athenians with the purpose to pay for the crews for building an additional 
100 triremes, to arrive at the total of 200 which was the size of the 
Athenian fleet in the battle of Salamis.  
Themistocles’ shipbuilding programme offered important employment 
benefits to the poorer class of Athenian citizens, first in ship and harbour 
construction and auxiliary services and then as paid oarsmen. In addition 
to the employment gains, the Naval Bill generated positive external effects 
by boosting production activities in carpentry (ships were made of wood) 
and metallurgy (ship rams were made of iron or bronze), other support 
activities and trades, and diffusion of skills. (See Kyriazis and 
Zouboulakis (2004) for details.) More importantly, the increased economic 
activity changed the status of the poorer classes of Athenians: Property 
ownership, military rank and political office were tightly connected. With 
the Cleisthenes reforms, the poorer Athenians had acquired the right to 
participate and vote in the assembly but not the right to occupy office. As 
naval campaigns lasted considerably longer than land campaigns and 
required large and well-trained crews, the economic and political status of 
the lower class Athenians manning the fleet changed fundamentally. They 
were gradually granted access to all political privileges enjoyed by the 
wealthier classes of landowners. Moreover, “Their paid employment by 
the state as rowers on the fleet had already introduced compensation into 
military service...This must have facilitated the introduction of pay for 
political service,” (Raaflub, 2007: 122), which was one of the hallmarks of 
the Athenian democracy. 
 
3. Political institutions and the natural resource curse 
 
Themistocles law and its far reaching consequences serve as an early case 
of the nexus between political institutions and economic performance 
emphasised by modern economic theory; see Acemoglu et al. (2005) and 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). In its simplest form the argument is that 
political absolutism which concentrates power in the hands of an 
(unelected) elite leads to extractive economic institutions, which offer 
little, if any, protection to private property from expropriation, and aim to 
extract resources from the majority of the population. These effects 
eliminate incentives for entrepreneurship, innovation and investment 
G. Tridimas: Homo Oeconomicus in Ancient Athens                                                                  441 
 
leading to economic stagnation. On the contrary, political pluralism which 
spreads political power across a wide range of actors fosters inclusive 
economic institutions that secure property rights and distribute economic 
power and access to the market widely; this in turn promotes economic 
prosperity for all (albeit with unequal shares). The Athenian shipbuilding 
programme was the result of the interaction between pre–existing political 
institutions that provided for citizen participation in the assembly and the 
chance event of the discovery of the silver deposit. Kyriazis and 
Zouboulakis (2004) consider the discovery of the silver vein as the sort of 
chance event that played an important role in shaping Athens’ subsequent 
development. It precipitated a break with the past, where the great 
majority of Athenians lived off agriculture, and a turn to the sea to exploit 
the new military technology represented by the trireme.  
It is instructive to contrast the 5
th
 century BC Athenian experience of 
the silver windfall with that of Spain two thousand years later after her 
conquest of the Americas. From the unification of the crowns of Ferdinand 
of Aragon and Isabella of Castile (married in 1469), the Spanish kings 
ruled as absolute monarchs with few independent political controls over 
their actions. In the 16
th
 century the Spanish conquistadors who took over 
the lands of Latin and South America set up authoritarian and hierarchical 
political structures combined with extractive economic institutions in 
Mexico and Peru, whose aim was to take silver and gold back to Spain and 
secure revenues for the crown. As a result, the populations of mainland 
Spain and the colonies were denied political and economic rights, while 
the crown and the associated nobility were the only beneficiaries of the 
new resources and economic opportunities. By stifling private enterprise, 
over time, this led to the impoverishment of Spain. On the other hand, the 
democratic structures prevailing in early 5
th
 century Athens allowed a 
wider sharing of the silver bonanza which in the first instance made 
possible the survival of Athens as an independent political entity, while in 
the longer run it underwrote its rise. 
The Athenian experience also illustrates how democratic institutions 
may prevent the “resource curse” where countries rich in natural 
resources, like oil and precious metals, perhaps counter–intuitively, are 
suffering from low rates of economic growth and are often ravaged by 
civil wars. A purely economic explanation of the low income growth is 
that resource abundance increases wealth inflating demand and prices of 
non–tradable goods, crowds out productive investment in manufacturing 
and education driving down exports and the rate of growth more generally. 
(See, for example, Sachs and Warner (2001).) However, another branch of 
literature attributes the resource curse to weak political institutions 
resulting in poor governance, weak rule of law and high corruption. 
Resource abundance creates significant economic rents enjoyed by the 
 Homo Oeconomicus 30(4) 
 
442 
elites in power which then resist challenges to their position by groups 
excluded from such benefits and the introduction of innovative 
technologies that undermine their source of wealth (Auty, 2001; Robinson 
et al. 2006). That is, an oligarchy finds easier to enrich themselves by 
owning and exploiting natural resources than creating wealth. This way, 
they may use the rents from natural wealth to reduce taxes avoiding 
electoral accountability, buy out opposition groups reducing political 
competition, and, by spending on the security apparatus, suppress demand 
for political change. However, this behaviour generates the incentive for 
rival rent seekers to challenge the ownership of the resources (violently 
more often than not) destabilizing the economy and the political regime, 
rather than innovate and invest in growth–promoting activities.10 On the 
contrary, a democratic polity, like Athens, that established inclusive 
institutions and distributed widely the revenue from mineral wealth led to 
political stability and economic prosperity, as well as military success.  
The interplay between natural resources and the institutions set up to 
exploit them was emphasised in the work of Fleck and Hansen (2006), 
who present a formal model of the emergence of democracy in Athens. 
The relatively infertile soil of Attica was better suited for growing olive 
trees whose cultivation required significant investment by landowners but 
paid off dividends after long gestation periods. The demos of freemen with 
modest size landholdings would undertake the required investment (which 
unlike work in wheat plantations was not easily observable by the ruling 
elite) and be prepared to defend the polis only if they were safe in the 
knowledge that their property rights were secure. Participatory politics and 
democratic procedures introduced by Cleisthenes were the guarantees of 
those economic rights. 
Athenian victory in the sea battle of Salamis depended on the Athenian 
triremes, which were largely financed by the silver windfall, following the 
decision of the Athenian electorate to spend the windfall on the oared 
warships. Clearly at a pivotal time participatory democracy determined 
public policy with far reaching consequences. Although it is virtually 
impossible to know the outcome of the Persian wars had the counterfactual 
of not building the navy taken place, there is no denying that the link 
between democracy – assembly vote – public spending worked to the 
broad benefit of the Athenians. 
                   
10
 See Frenkel (2012) for a review of the causes proposed in the literature. Testing 
the resource curse hypothesis with an international sample Mehlum et al. (2006) 
find that countries rich in natural resources but weak institutions experience low 
growth rates. See also Busse and Gröning (2012) for a review of empirical studies 
and evidence that exports of natural resources lead to higher levels of corruption. 
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4. Voting and public finances 
 
The second issue raised by the present study is the binary nature of the 
choice of the Athenians, that is, to spend the silver bonanza either on cash 
transfers or building the fleet, but not a combination of the two. Since 
consumers benefit from both, it is reasonable to expect that the windfall 
would have been allocated between a cash distribution of less than 10 
drachmas per head together with the construction of fewer than 100 
ships.
11
 We examine a number of arguments that may account for the all–
or–nothing choice, notably, non–convex military technology, agenda 
setting, ignorance and lack of economic rationality. 
In the first instance, the decision might have been dictated by military 
considerations. The forces amassed by the enemy and/or military 
technology might have been non–convex, or “lumpy,” that is, trireme–
based defence becomes effective only after a minimum number of ships 
are available for service; otherwise ship formation and battle performance 
are ineffectual. In other words, military technology dictated that the 
number of ships cannot be treated as a continuous variable to be adjusted 
at the margin. However, if that was the case, one would have expected to 
see the point mentioned in the literature. Moreover, as already described, 
when the Persian threat became visible the Athenians were able to 
promptly adjust the size of the fleet, implying a kind of continuity of the 
use of inputs.   
The second explanation for the binary choice may be the agenda setting 
powers of the officials proposing policy to the assembly.
12
 Assuming a 
standard utility function defined over transfers and defence, where 
marginal utility is positive but decreasing, and taking into account the 
budget constraint, silver revenue = cash transfer + defence expenditure, 
voting is over a single dimension and voter preferences are single–peaked, 
so that the median voter is decisive. Let UM be the utility maximizing level 
of combining defence and transfers preferred by the median voter, and let 
UD and UT denote respectively his utility when the entire budget is spent 
on defence and on transfers. Moreover, suppose that the median voter is 
better off when the entire budget is spent on defence rather than transfers, 
so that by construction, UM > UD > UT. If for his own reasons the agenda 
setter proposes “transfer only” and “defence only,” the latter is established 
                   
11
 More formally, only under very restrictive assumptions about preferences and 
the relative values of income and government revenue a zero–level transfer is 
consistent with consumer utility maximization.  
12
 This suggestion for budget determination follows from the Romer and Rosenthal 
(1979). 
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as the collective choice equilibrium. That is, the entire revenue is spent on 
defence as observed in ancient Athens. This account is not very likely. 
Ancient Athens lacked a professional bureaucracy with agenda setting 
powers, while any citizen could address the assembly. Thus, in all 
probability the median voter equilibrium combining transfers and defence 
would have been called during the assembly deliberations and eventually 
prevailed.  
A third explanation for the binary choice may be ignorance of what 
exactly was involved in dividing the revenue because of the complexity of 
the issues. Dividing the funds between a fleet, calculating the cash transfer 
and balancing the books might have been a complex calculation, too 
demanding on the Athenians. Given the lack of accounting techniques and 
other quantitative knowledge at the time, proposing a large round figure, 
like one hundred ships, might have served as a shortcut for a policy 
proposal that was easier to understand and cost. This argument however 
ill–sits with the systematic thought and ingenuity that the Greeks had 
already shown in various areas of intellect and practical applications, as 
well as in calculating the projected revenues from the silver mines. 
The fourth explanation is to argue that the Athenians were not 
interested in the higher consumption resulting from distributing the silver 
windfall as cash transfers, but were only motivated by the pursuit of 
military glory that would be achieved by building a strong defence. This 
argument echoes the “primitivist” view of the ancient economy espoused 
by Finlay (1973) and Millet (1991), which rejects the applicability of 
instrumental rationality, where each actor is a homo oeconomicus 
maximizing a well–defined utility function subject to the relevant 
constraints given his information set. In this tradition the ancient economy 
was primitive, small scale and household–based; individuals pursued the 
ideal of self–sufficiency at the household and the city–state level, and 
economic activity was embedded in social and political institutions. It 
considers the ancient actors as “status–maximizing” motivated chiefly by 
military honour, and interested in economic variables like consumption or 
profits only as a way to promote the military and political success of the 
city–state and their own abilities to play a leading role in it. In terms of a 
formal utility maximization framework, the pursuit of military victory to 
the exclusion of financial interests would be modeled by assuming a very 
restrictive type of preferences that leaves out material attributes.
13
 Yet, the 
assumptions that the Athenians voted for defence because they had no 
                   
13
 In terms of a formal utility maximization framework, this would be modeled by 
assuming a very special type of preferences that excluded material attributes. I 
thank Manfred Holler for bringing this possibility to my attention.  
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interest in cash is contradicted by the statements in the sources (that 
Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to build the fleet against the cash 
distribution of the bonanza) and, in later occasions, when spending public 
revenues for civilian projects (amongst others, temples and the theatre 
throughout the 5
th
 and 4
th
 centuries). More generally, the primitivist 
account is rebuffed by contemporary “modernist” scholars who explain 
that the Athenian economy was market–driven and characterized by 
sophisticated institutions for private contracting and market exchanges and 
it was underpinned by values that encouraged entrepreneurship; see 
amongst others Burke (1992) and Cohen (1992) and Bitros and Karayiannis 
(2008).
14
 Other scholars adopt more eclectic views. Examining 4
th
 century 
Athenian investment behaviour Christesen (2003) concludes that the base 
assumption in ancient history should be reflexive rationality, which posits 
that actors pursued profit maximization aware of risk and return factors 
but were sensitive to social norms (specifically, the inherent virtue of 
agriculture). In his analysis of the institutions of Athens, Lyttkens (2013: 
5) assumes that “while individuals try to be rational, they can only be so in 
a limited way, displaying bounded rationality…and satisficing behaviour.”  
Nevertheless, transposing notions of non – instrumental rationality 
from economics to politics offers new valuable insights to various aspects 
of political behaviour and especially the motivation to vote. In the 
standard application of rational choice theory, voters vote instrumentally, 
that is, they vote for the policy that they ex ante expect to leave them 
better off. The problem with this type of instrumental voting is that it is 
irrational to vote, since it is costly for a voter to acquire information about 
policy issues, while he has an infinitesimally small chance that his vote 
will decide the outcome. On the contrary, voting may be expressive, where 
a rational voter aware that his vote cannot decide the electoral outcome 
votes for the utility gained by carrying out what may be considered a civic 
duty and by expressing support for a policy or a person rather than his 
self–interest, see Brennan and Hamlin (1998) and (1999) Hamlin and 
Jennings (2011). Expressive voting may be motivated by a voter’s wish to 
put across his social identity relative to others and support for particular 
values and ideologies or political leaders (and indeed project an identity 
that pleases the individual himself or others but ultimately as noted by 
Hillman (2010), runs against his own interests). Elements of expressive 
voting are easily perceptible in Athenian political life. There is a certain 
element of pleasure derived from the social interaction when attending 
mass assembly meetings, listening to the public speakers and endorsing or 
                   
14
 For details on the pursuit of honour, see Davies (1993) chapter 6, and Cartledge 
(2009) chapter 2; for a critique of Finley, see Morris (1994). 
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rejecting political leaders without necessarily expecting to influence the 
outcome.
15
  
In the case of the naval bill, an expressive element was likely present 
since it is possible that the personal appeal of Themistocles swayed the 
vote.
16
 At the same time there are good reasons to believe that 
instrumental voting offers a good approximation to the Athenian political 
scene. Participatory politics and assembly deliberation were the hallmarks 
of the direct democracy. By 482/3 a generation of Athenians (sine the 
Cleisthenes reforms of 508) had lived through and experienced political 
decision making via sovereign assembly meetings without political parties, 
where it was in citizen’s interest to get informed about what was involved 
and reveal preferences
17
, especially since the same citizens would be 
called to fight and risk their lives. It bears noting that, as put by Hamlin 
and Jennings (2011: 650), “expressive and instrumental motivations are 
best seen as joint inputs into an overall analysis of behaviour, rather than 
alternative models.”   
In positive and normative questions where the focus of attention is 
predicting or determining outcomes, the model of instrumental rationality 
has proved indispensable. This is the case in the present inquiry, where the 
model of homo oeconomicus provides a rich and suitable framework to 
examine the choice between cash and defence expenditure. That is to say, 
when confronted with a range of options, the rational actor chose the one 
which was likely to confer him the biggest payoff. This is formally 
investigated in the following section.  
 
5. Conflict and the choice for defence 
 
Kyriazis (2009: 115) argues that the decision of the Athenian assembly to 
build triremes “...represented a balance between ‘altruistic’ and ‘self-
interested’ behaviour on behalf of the voters who voted for it… because 
the voters sacrificed personal consumption in exchange for the public 
good of defence that they hoped would guarantee for them their way of 
life, values, religion, etc. It also embodied self-interest because 
Themistocles promised to the poorer citizens, who would become the 
                   
15 It seems the Athenians were keenly following the assembly debates cheering and 
booing the speakers (Hansen 1999). 
16 Plutarch 5.4 writes [Themistocles] was on good terms with the common folk, 
partly because he could call off-hand the name of every citizen, and partly because 
he rendered the service of a safe and impartial arbitrator in cases of private 
obligation and settlement out of court. 
17 On the aggregation of information and coordination of collective action, see 
Ober (2008). 
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oarsmen of the ships, “full citizens’ rights ... and remuneration for 
rowing.” Unfortunately this account of the vote is unsatisfactory. As it is 
shown here, voting for defence is perfectly consistent with the self–
interests of both rich and poor, so evoking altruism to explain the vote 
outcome is not necessary and probably misleading. Nor do employment 
opportunities for the poor citizens offer a satisfactory argument, because if 
Themistocles and the majority of citizens were only interested in employment 
benefits, the money could have been spent on public building projects, like 
temples.
18
 To interpret the shipbuilding programme as an employment 
project misses the point that the extra revenue was spent to increase Athenian 
defence capabilities.  
A rational actor facing a military threat will spend the resources under 
his command in the type of contest (land or naval warfare) that brings him 
the highest expected payoff. A more articulate account of the Athenian 
vote recognises that choosing to spend the revenue on the triremes 
increased the probability of successful defence. Drawing on the economics 
of conflict the present Section explores this issue. The economics of 
conflict is a branch of literature that applies conventional standard utility 
maximization notions and game theory techniques to analyse the 
behaviour of actors when instead of market exchanges they engage in 
fighting over resources and they face the risk that their assets will be taken 
away; see Anderton and Carter (2009) for an introductory, book-length, 
treatment of the topic and Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) for a formal 
survey of the literature. As already described, the Athenians built the fleet 
to meet the naval challenge from the island of Aegina. The key here is to 
appreciate that the Athenians realized that they were engaging in a conflict 
whose outcome was uncertain or rather probabilistic. Building the navy 
increased substantially the probability of victory. In order to fend off the 
security and economic threat from Aegina they had to equip appropriately, 
trading off increased consumption and a possible loss of freedom for the 
probability to win the military contest.  
 
(i)Athenian payoff under transfer payments 
 
Formally, we consider a setting with two rival players, Athens, A, and her 
opponent, B. The latter may denote either Aegina or Persia. Let Y denote 
the size of Athenian resources available for consumption independent of 
the silver windfall, and let S denote the value of the silver windfall. When 
                   
18 Indeed after the end of the Persian wars, Themistocles started the fortification of 
Athens. The Long Walls and the temple building in the Acropolis were completed 
in the mid 5th century. 
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S is used to finance a transfer to the Athenian citizens, the total resources 
available to the Athenians for consumption purposes is the sum Y+S, 
while if S is used to finance military spending the total available for 
consumption is Y. However, war results in destruction of a proportion       
0 <  of the available resources, so that the net available resources are 
(1–)(Y+S). Since in the 480s Athens was fighting an existentialistic war, 
it is assumed that if the Athenians win the war they keep the available 
resources, while if they lose the war they are left with nothing. That is, we 
abstract from consideration of the possible war loot that the Athenians can 
get if they beat their enemy. On the other hand, their aggressor is assumed 
not to risk any of their domestic wealth, so that if they beat the Athenians 
the take all the available resources, (1–)(Y+S), while if they are beaten 
they get nothing.  
Let the freely chosen expenditures to finance the effort required to 
fight, weapons and other activities associated with fighting a war by the 
two sides be WA and WB respectively. Following standard practice, the 
probability P that the Athenians win the war is assumed to depend 
positively on their defence expenditure, WA, and negatively on that of B, 
WB, according to the contest success function (see Tullock, 1980; 
Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007; Chang et al. 2007; and Tridimas 2011b). 
 
   
   
           
      (1) 
 
The probability that the Athenians lose the war is 1–P. The parameters 
0 <  < 1 and 0 < 1– < 1, measure the war effectiveness of A and B 
respectively. For example, depending on territorial advantage, military 
planning, organization, morale of the fighting men and other relevant 
considerations Athens may have a military advantage against her enemy, 
so that  ½ 1– . When the two sides are equally effective, then  =1–
 =½; if in addition they spend equal sums of resources to fight the civil 
war, WA=WB, Athens and her enemy stand an equal probability of success, 
P=1–P=½. The expected payoffs of Athens when the Athenians use the 
silver windfall to make a transfer payment to each citizen, and her 
opponent, are written as follows (where subscript T refers to transfers) 
  
UT
A
 = PT (1–)(Y+S) – WA           (2.A) 
  
UT
B
 = (1–PT)(1–)(Y+S) – WB    (2.B) 
 
The Nash equilibrium of the war game is obtained when A maximizes 
(2.A) with respect to WA subject to (1) treating WB as given, and B 
maximizes (2.B) with respect to WB subject to (1) treating WA as given. 
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Solving we obtain the following equilibrium values of expenditures for 
fighting and probability that A wins the war (it can easily be checked that 
the second order conditions for maximization are satisfied) 
  
   
     
                    and    
     (3) 
 
Clearly, the size of defence expenditure varies proportionately with the 
size of income at risk, dWAD*/dY > 0. Substituting from (3) into (1) we 
obtain the expected payoff from using the silver revenue to make a cash 
transfer to each citizen 
 
   
                   (4) 
 
The expected payoff depends positively on the fighting effectiveness, 
or, equivalently, the equilibrium probability of military victory, the size of 
the total resources available, and negatively on the losses from war.  
 
(ii)Athenian payoff under defence 
 
When the Athenians spend the entire silver windfall to boost military 
expenditure, the probability of victory is assumed to be 
 
    
       
               
      (5) 
 
Two new elements are simultaneously introduced. In the first instance, 
with the silver revenue spent on triremes, total military expenditure 
expands to the sum of WA+S, where WA is again endogenously determined. 
Second, and equally important, in order to account for the enhanced 
military capabilities of the trireme, when the silver bonanza is spent to 
build the navy, the war effectiveness of Athens becomes  which is 
assumed to be greater than without investing in ships,  , where 
again0 < < 1. The effectiveness of her enemy is now 1–. Note that 
dPD/dS > 0 and dPD/d > 0, that is the probability of victory increases 
with the sum invested in triremes and the effectiveness of the Athenian 
defence.  
The underlying rationale for expressing the probability of Athenian 
victory as in equation (5) is as follows. The Athenians realized that if the 
silver revenue was distributed as cash, it would not be feasible for the 
citizens to collect the sums needed to build a fleet and reap the benefit of 
the sea defence; instead they would have to rely on the land forces. They 
would have been richer by ten drachmas but would have to fight as 
hoplites and light–armed thetes. The reason is that following the 
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Cleisthenes reforms, personal tax payments had been abolished because 
they were considered as a form of servitude and unfit for free citizens. 
However, they also appreciated that if the polis kept the silver revenue 
instead of returning them as cash transfers, it would be possible to finance 
the navy. In other words, the polis as a public body was able to direct and 
coordinate the construction of the navy, so that collectively the Athenians 
could accomplish what they were not able to achieve individually. This 
difference reveals a form of non–equivalence of public funds: Money in 
the hands of the citizens will not be used the same way as the same sum of 
money in the hands of the polis. The reason is not the presence of an 
agency relation (where in maximizing their private interests the public 
officials pursue a course of action different to that preferred by the 
citizens) or ignorance, but the difficulties that citizens may face to act 
collectively after they receive the transfer; that is, the citizens individually 
may not be able to build the expensive triremes.  
Assuming further that the positive external effects generated by 
building and maintaining a fleet increase output by a quantity S, 0<<1 
(as suggested by Kyriazis and Zouboulakis 2004), the expected payoffs of 
Athens and her opponent are now written as (where subscript D refers to 
defence) 
 
UD
A
 = PD (1–)(Y+S) – WA     (6.A) 
  
UD
B
 = (1–PD)(1–)(Y+S) – WB    (6.B) 
 
Working as before, that is Athens maximizes (6.A) given the reaction 
of the enemy and the enemy maximizes (6.B) given the reaction of 
Athens, the equilibrium values of military expenditure and the probability 
of Athens beating her opponent are given by the expressions 
 
   
                     ;  
   
     
   ;  
  
           (7) 
 
Attention must be drawn to two important implications of the equilibrium 
expression for WAD*. First, and as it was the case with equation (3), we 
obtain that defence expenditure increases with the size of income at risk, 
dWAD*/dY >0. This conclusion explains why the Athenians increased the 
size of the fleet when it became obvious that Persia rather than Aegina was 
the most dangerous enemy. Competition against Aegina concerned 
security of the shipping lanes at a time when Athens depended on 
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imported grain. Conflict against Persia included not only trade but the very 
existence of Athens as a free entity. An existential threat implies that a far 
bigger size of Y was at stake against Persian rather Aegina and the size of 
expenditure to build the navy increased accordingly. The second important 
observation from (7) is that since by assumption  , the probability of 
victory is higher, PD* =  >  = PT*.  Substituting from (7) into (6.A) we 
obtain that the equilibrium Athenian net expected payoff from using the 
silver revenue to build triremes is 
 
  
                       (8) 
 
As before, the expected payoff depends positively on the Athenian 
fighting effectiveness, the size of the total resources available, and 
negatively on the losses from war.  
We can now check whether the Athenians are better off in ex ante sense 
by using the silver bonanza to pay transfers or build the fleet. Whether the 
Athenians choose the transfer or the shipbuilding programme depends on 
which of the two uses of the revenue yields the higher expected utility. 
Subtracting (4) from (8) we have 
 
  
     
                 [                ]   (9) 
 
The first component of the sum in the right–hand–side of (9) represents 
the advantage from investing the revenue from the silver in triremes, a 
superior military technology, and is positive since by assumption  . 
The second component represents the net value of expected output when 
the silver windfall is invested in defence, and recalling that   < 1 and  < 
1, it is also positive, since                   That is, we reach the 
unambiguous conclusion that in an ex ante sense, the Athenians are better 
off by using the silver windfall to finance their defensive program rather 
than awarding themselves a higher level of consumption. They therefore 
choose to build the ships. It bears noting that the same conclusion holds 
even when =0. That is, the Athenians are better off with defence 
expenditure even if there are no external effects from building the fleet. 
More generally, it can easily be confirmed that the difference VD
A–VT
A
 is 
increasing in the variables of interest ,  and S and on private resources 
(income). 
Therefore, the model of expected utility maximization under 
uncertainty and strategic interactions between the contestants accounts for 
the observed choice of the Athenians without recourse to non–economic 
arguments. This finding supports emphatically the application of the homo 
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oeconomicus hypothesis in understanding the pattern of behaviour in 
ancient Athens.
19
 
To complete the historical narrative that opened this work it is worth 
noting that the Athenian investment in triremes also eliminated the threat 
from Aegina. After the Persian wars Aegina gradually declined and 
became a member of the Athens–led alliance established after the Salamis 
victory.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of the present paper has been to examine the economic 
rationale of the choice of the majority of the Athenians in 483/2 to invest 
the public revenue accruing from a newly found vein of silver in building 
a fleet rather than distributing it amongst themselves as a lump–sum 
payment. The effect of direct democracy and majority voting on the 
disposal of public funds was first discussed. Since standard public 
economics reasoning would imply that citizens in a direct democracy 
would have voted to divide the silver revenue between a cash transfer and 
defence, a number of arguments for choosing defence–only were 
reviewed. These related to lumpiness of defence, agenda setting, limited 
ability to assess the net benefits of the programme and lack of economic 
rationality. For all of the above sufficiently good counter–arguments were 
found. The analysis then proposed an explanation based on the economic 
theory of conflict. Acknowledging that an increase in military expenditure 
is followed by a commensurate increase in the probability of victory 
against the enemy, and that the Athenians realized they could invest in 
building triremes only when they acted collectively but not individually, it 
was shown that investing the revenue in defence resulted in a larger ex 
ante payoff.  
The analysis was grounded on notions of instrumental rationality which 
has gained considerable traction in recent analysis of ancient economic 
history. Of course, it only offered a snapshot of the complexity of the 
conflict between the alliances of the independent city–states of ancient 
Hellas against Persia. Several questions of interest remain, including an 
economic analysis of the formation of the alliance to conduct the defensive 
                   
19 Standard expected utility theory offered a strong prediction in favour of defence 
spending. An anonymous referee pointed out that the prospect theory of Kahneman 
and Tversky (1989) which emphasises that fear of loss has a stronger impact on an 
individual’s choice than the expectation of a gain, strengthens the case for voting 
in favour of defence when the Persian threat became apparent. The Athenians were 
fighting for their survival and freedom while the Persians were fighting for 
conquest and under command of king Xerxes. 
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war, its breakup, and the offensive led by Athens against Persia, as well as 
the changing economic fortune of the silver mines in later years. These are 
left for future research. 
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Appendix: The sources 
 
Herodotus. The Histories, [7.144], A.D. Godley (ed.) 
 
The advice of Themistocles had prevailed on a previous occasion. The 
revenues from the mines at Laurium [1] had brought great wealth into the 
Athenians' treasury, and when each man was to receive ten drachmae for 
his share, Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to make no such division 
but to use the money to build two hundred ships for the war, that is, for the 
war with Aegina. This was in fact the war the outbreak of which saved 
Hellas by compelling the Athenians to become seamen. The ships were 
not used for the purpose for which they were built, but later came to serve 
Hellas in her need. These ships, then, had been made and were already 
there for the Athenians' service, and now they had to build yet others. In 
their debate after the giving of the oracle they accordingly resolved that 
they would put their trust in the god and meet the foreign invader of Hellas 
with the whole power of their fleet, ships and men, and with all other 
Greeks who were so minded. 
[1]Silver, lead, and perhaps copper mines in Attica, from which the 
state drew an annual revenue. Apparently when this exceeded the usual 
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amount the general public received a largess. Even if the population 
numbered 30,000 (cp. Hdt. 5.97) ten drachmae per head would be only 50 
talents; far too small a sum for the building of 200 ships; Herodotus 
cannot mean more than that the Laurium money was a contribution 
towards a ship-building fund. 
 
Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War, [1.14.1–2], B. Jowett 
(ed.) 
 
These were the most powerful navies, and even these, which came into 
existence many generations after the Trojan War, appear to have consisted 
chiefly of fifty-oared vessels and galleys of war, as in the days of Troy; as 
yet triremes were not common. But a little before the Persian War and the 
death of Darius [485], who succeeded Cambyses, the Sicilian tyrants and 
the Corcyraeans had them in considerable numbers. No other maritime 
powers of any consequence arose in Hellas before the expedition of 
Xerxes. The Aeginetans, Athenians, and a few more had small fleets, and 
these mostly consisted of fifty-oared vessels. Even the ships which the 
Athenians built quite recently at the instigation of Themistocles, when 
they were at war with the Aeginetans and in expectation of the Barbarian 
[Persians], even these ships with which they fought at Salamis were not 
completely decked. 
 
Aristotle. The Athenian Constitution [22.27], translated by H. Rackham. 
 
Two years later, in the archonship of Nicomedes, in consequence of the 
discovery of the mines at Maronea, the working of which had given the 
state a profit of a hundred talents, the advice was given by some persons 
that the money should be distributed among the people; but Themistocles 
prevented this, not saying what use he would make of the money, but 
recommending that it should be lent to the hundred richest Athenians, each 
receiving a talent, so that if they should spend it in a satisfactory manner, 
the state would have the advantage, but if they did not, the state should 
call in the money from the borrowers. On these terms the money was put 
at his disposal, and he used it to get a fleet of a hundred triremes built, 
each of the hundred borrowers having one ship built, and with these they 
fought the naval battle at Salamis against the barbarians. And it was during 
this period that Aresteides son of Lysimachus was ostracized.  
 
Plutarch. [4.1-3], Themistocles, Bernadotte Perrin (ed.) 
 
And so, in the first place, whereas the Athenians were wont to divide up 
among themselves the revenue coming from the silver mines at Laureium, 
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he, and he alone, dared to come before the people with a motion that this 
division be given up, and that with these moneys triremes be constructed 
for the war against Aegina [484-483]. This was the fiercest war then 
troubling Hellas, and the islanders controlled the sea, owing to the number 
of their ships. 
Wherefore all the more easily did Themistocles carry his point, not by 
trying to terrify the citizens with dreadful pictures of Darius or the 
Persians—these were too far away and inspired no very serious fear of 
their coming, but by making opportune use of the bitter jealousy which 
they cherished toward Aegina in order to secure the armament he desired. 
The result was that with those moneys they built a hundred triremes, with 
which they actually fought at Salamis against Xerxes. 
And after this, by luring the city on gradually and turning its progress 
toward the sea, urging that with their infantry they were no match even for 
their nearest neighbors, but that with the power they would get from their 
ships they could not only repel the Barbarians but also take the lead in 
Hellas, he made them, instead of “steadfast hoplites”—to quote Plato's 
words, [Plato, Laws 4.706] sea-tossed mariners, and brought down upon 
himself this accusation: “Themistocles robbed his fellow-citizens of spear 
and shield, and degraded the people of Athens to the rowing-pad and the 
oar.”  
 
